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KRISCHER V. MCIvER: AVOIDING THE DANGERS OF ASSISTED SUICIDE
There is no man who is master of the breath of life so as to retain it, and none
has mastery of the day of death.'
I. INTRODUCrION
"[B]roadly construing the privacy amendment 2 to include the right to assisted
suicide" might "run the risk of arrogating to [the court] those powers to make social
policy that as a constitutional matter belong only to the legislature."3 For this
reason, courts addressing this issue consistently hold that constitutional provisions
do not protect a "right to die" by physician assisted suicide.4 Although courts have
' Ecclesiastes 8:8. Suicide is a complex moral issue which impacts various aspects of
society and religion. Darrel W. Amandsen, The Ninth Circuit Courts Treatment of the
History of Suicide by Ancient Jews and Christians in Compassion in Dying v. State of
Washington: Historical Naiveti or Special Pleading?, 13 ISSUEs L. & MED. 365, 365
(1998). Although courts have relied on the historical, biblical, and religious treatment of
suicide in making decisions on assisted suicide, the issue "is so historically and conceptually
muddled" that it may not be a reliable basis for arguments when debating the status of this
particular method of death. Id.
2 FLA. CONST. art. I, §23 Right of privacy provides:
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This section shall
not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings
as provided by law.
3 Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 104 (Fla. 1997). "The powers of the state
government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person
belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other
branches unless expressly provided herein." FLA. CONST. art. II, §3. This court did not want
a judicial decision on moral issues to be the deciding factor on assisted suicide. Krisher,
697 So. 2d at 104.
4 Krisher, So. 2d at 99-100 (holding that the Florida prohibition of assisted suicide does
not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,
2261 (1997) (holding that Washington's statute banning assisted suicide did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2296
(1997) (holding that New York's prohibition of assisted suicide does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F.Supp.
1152 (E. D. Mich. 1997) (holding that prohibition of assisted suicide does not violate
Federal Due Process or the Michigan Savings Clause); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d
714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1083 (1995) (finding that the U.S. Constitution
does not prohibit criminal penalties for one who assists a person in committing suicide and
that the Michigan statute does not violate the Title-Object Clause of the Michigan
Constitution).
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not precluded legalization, policy driven opinions leave the question to the state
legislatures for final decision.5
In Krischer v. Mclver, the Florida Supreme Court upheld6 the constitutionality
of Florida's statute prohibiting assisted suicide7 under both the Florida privacy
amendment 8 and the U.S. Constitution. 9 After Krischer Florida residents cannot
rely on their privacy rights to protect from prosecution a person who assists them
5 See, e.g., Editorial, When 'Suicide'Is Homicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, October 16, 1998,
at 52 ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court decided that laws ... banning physician assisted suicide
were not in conflict with the [U.S.] Constitution. But it also left the door open for states to
permit the practice."); Linda L. Emanuel, Facing Requests for Physician Assisted Suicide:
Toward a Practical and Principled Clinical Skill Set, 280 JAMA, 643, 643 (1998) ("The
[U.S.] Supreme Court's unanimous decision to uphold the rights of states to prohibit
[physician assisted suicide] nevertheless allows that states might also permit it."); Charles
E. Hall, No Longer an Option for One AIDS Patient and His Doctor, MED. ECON., Sept. 8,
1997, at 28 (asserting that both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme Court have
left "wiggle room" for the state legislatures ); see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Leaving the Door
Ajar: The Supreme Court andAssisted Suicide, 32 U. RICH. L. REv. 313 (1998) (discussing
that the United States Supreme Court decisions give states the room to legislate to allow
assisted suicide).
6 See Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 104 (Fla. 1997).
7 FLA. STAT. ANN §782.08 (1995). "Every person deliberately assisting another in the
commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.775.084." Id.; see also FLA. STAT.
ANN §765.309. Mercy killing or euthanasia not authorized; suicide distinguished
(1) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve
mercy killing or euthanasia, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying.
(2) The withholding or withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures from a patient in
accordance with any provision of this chapter does not, for any purpose, constitute
a suicide.
Id.
8 For text of the privacy amendment, see supra note 2.
9 The statute was challenged based on the federal Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1997). The relevant portion of the
Fourteenth Amendment states:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
[Vol. 32:4
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss4/4
KRISCHER V. MCIVER
in committing suicide.' ° While this decision promotes the policy arguments against
assisted suicide," it also limits the previously broad construction of Florida's right
of privacy.' 2 However, while denying constitutional protection, the court stated that
the legislature could enact laws allowing assisted suicide.' 3 With this, the court
effectively and purposefully left this question open for continued public debate.' 4
Generally, this Casenote analyzes the Krischer court's decision to deny a broad
constitutional protection of the "right to die" by assisted suicide and some of the
ramifications arising therefrom. 5 Part II presents a brief history of the debate
concerning the right to assisted suicide and the prevailing judicial approach to the
issue.' 6 Part I discusses the facts of the case, procedural history and holding of the
majority.' 7 Finally, Part IV examines the Krischer court's analysis of the
constitutional rights implicated in the assisted suicide debate, and the decision to
deny protection for assisted suicide under the privacy amendment based on policy
"' Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102.
" Id. at 100. To justify an intrusion on individual's privacy right, the court needed to
establish compelling state interests. Id. This court relied heavily on the major policy
arguments against assisted suicide. Id.
12 See Shannon Brewer, Comment, Constitutional Law: Ending the Expansion of the
Florida Privacy Amendment, 49 FLA. L. REv. 821, 824-26 (1997):
Refusing to expand protection for the right of privacy, the Krischer court departed
from the direction the Supreme Court of Florida previously had been taking. The
instant court suggested the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
case of personal decision making - a situation where a privacy right has almost
always attached before. The instant court held that it would not construe the
privacy amendment to include a right to assisted suicide and sought to narrow the
interpretation of the privacy amendment's reach.
Id.
3 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 103.
14Id. at 104 ("We do not hold that a carefully crafted statute authorizing assisted suicide
would be unconstitutional"); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275
(1997) ("Throughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding
permits this debate to continue"); Id. at 2292 (Souter, J. concurring) ("The court should
accordingly stay its hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration").
5 See infra notes 20-119, and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 20-38, and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 39-63, and accompanying text.
1999]
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reasons.18 Additionally, this Note weighs the policy arguments about assisted
suicide in light of legislative action.19
II. BACKGROUND
As health care and technology developed, there came a realization that even
given physicians' best efforts, some patients would continue to suffer or would
remain in a comatose state for a long time.20 Out of this arose a debate concerning
a "right to die. 21 In the U.S., the issue has been discussed for over one hundred
years. 22 The first major cases in this country centered on removing life-support
18 See infra notes 64-98, and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 99-114, and accompanying text.
20 With modem technology the lives of individuals with degenerative diseases like cancer
can be prolonged indefinitely. MICHAEL DECOURCY-HiNDs, AT DEATH' S DOOR WHAT ARE
THE CHOICES?, NATIONAL ISSUES FORUMs 3-4 (1998). However, in some cases death
becomes "a science experiment" wherein patients are not afforded the opportunity for "a
peaceful and comfortable parting with families in familiar surroundings." Id. at 4.
21 The "right to die" arose as courts responded to patients who wanted more control in
making decisions regarding their own medical treatment. Note, Physician Assisted Suicide
and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105 HARV. L. REv. 2021, 2021-22 (1992).
Commentators on the subject suggest that the right to die was an extension of the doctrine
of informed consent rather than constitutional rights. Tricia Jonas Hackleman, Comment,
Violation of an Individual's Right to Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause ofAction,
64 U. CiN. L. REv. 1355, 1359-60 (1996); see also Edward A. Lyon, Comment, The Right
to Die: An Exercise of Informed Consent, Not an Extension of the Constitutional Right to
Privacy, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1367 (1990) (asserting that privacy rights should not protect a
right to die).
" DECOURCY-HINDS, supra note 20, at 4. A timeline synopsizes the history of the
debate.
1870's - First major debate about physician assisted suicide in the U.S. 1906 -
Ohio legislature rejects bill to legalize assisted suicide. 1938 - National Society
for the Legalization of Euthanasia is formed. 1941-New York legislature rejects
bill to legalize assisted suicide. 1973 - American Hospital Association issues a
"Patient Bill of Rights," which says patients should have the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment. 1976 - New Jersey Supreme Court permits the parents of
comatose Karen Ann Quinlan to disconnect her respirator. 1988 - Unitarian-
Universalists become the first religious body to approve of assisted suicide for the
terminally ill. 1990 -Dr. Jack Kevorkian, a retired pathologist in Michigan, begins
his crusade to legalize physician-assisted suicide by helping a woman with
Alzheimer's disease end her life. In its first right-to-die decision, the Nancy
Cruzan case, U.S. Supreme Court rules that competent people have a constitutional
[Vol. 32:4
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systems from comatose patients.23 In such cases, courts protected a patient's refusal
of treatment with constitutional provisions.2 4
Historically, suicide carried an extremely negative connotation,25 but in the past
decade, physician assisted suicide forcefully entered the right to die debates after
right to refuse treatment, and that legal guardians can make that decision for
incompetent patients. 1991-Voters in Washington narrowly reject a ballot
initiative to legalize physician-assisted suicide. 1992 - California voters reject a
similar measure. 1994 - Voters in Oregon approve a ballot initiative to legalize
physician-assisted suicide, but the law is stayed pending judicial review. 1996 -
Two federal appellate courts, in overturning state bans on assisted suicide, rule that
terminally ill patients have a constitutional right to physician assisted suicide. 1997
- U.S. Supreme Court throws out lower court decisions, ruling that there is no
constitutional right to assisted suicide. But the court leaves open the possibility
that some limited right to die could be claimed in the future.
Id.
23 In the Matter of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990) (discussing whether parents of woman left incompetent by severe injuries sustained
in an automobile accident could order the removal of her artificial hydration and feeding
systems); Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976) (deciding whether the father of a 22 year old woman in a continuous
vegetative state could, as guardian, decide to discontinue her life support treatment); Bouvia
v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986) (addressing whether a patient could
have a life sustaining feeding tube removed).
24 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (holding that a competent person has a right to refuse medical
treatment); Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663 (holding that privacy rights encompass a patient's right
to decline medical treatment in certain circumstances); Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300
(holding that a patient can refuse life-sustaining treatment as a matter of right).
25 From ancient times suicide was a disfavored practice. BRIAN P. JOHNSTON, DEATH AS
A SALESMAN: WHAT'S WRONG WITH ASSISTED SUICIDE 85-97 (New Regency Publishing
1997). For example,
[T]he ancient laws of Athens and Thebes punished a man who committed suicide
by denying him a conventional burial and confiscating his property. And since you
cannot "prosecute" a corpse, in symbolic rejection, the Greeks would bury the
body of a suicide outside of the city limits with its hand cut off.
Id. In the thirteenth century St. Thomas Aquinas wrote that suicide was a violation of the
6" Commandment which orders "Thou shalt not kill." Craig Peyton Gaumer & Paul R.
Griffith, Article, Whose Life Is It Anyway?: An Analysis and Commentary on the Law of
Physician Assisted Suicide, 42 S.D. L. REv. 357, 360-61 (1996-1997). In this country
suicide was a criminal act. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258,2263 (1997). When
an individual took his own life, his family lost claims to his estate. Id. These laws were
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Dr. Jack Kevorkian first used his "suicide machine. ' 6 While this incident started
the most recent public debate on the issue,27 states had contemplated the discussion.
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia disapprove of assisted suicide in their
laws,28 and it is a crime in thirty-six states.29
26 Kevorkian "packaged his own death machines in handy portable house call sizes."
Jonathan Gromer, Machines of Death: Effectiveness and Humaneness of Execution
Equipment, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1998, at 56. The machines are of two types: (1) a
carbon monoxide canister wherein the patient pulls a handle to start the flow of the deadly
gas and (2) an i.v. wherein the patient pulls a string to begin the flow of a deadly chemical.
Id.; see also CATHLEEN DESMONE, DEATH ON DEMAND: PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE IN
THE UNITED STATES 15 (1996) (describing Kevorkian's suicide machine as an IV tube which
with the touch of a button the patient can change the flow from saline to potassium
chloride). Between 1990 and 1997, Kevorkian assisted with 50 suicides. JOHNSTON, supra
note 25, at 57-59. So far, Kevorkian has not been convicted for any assisted suicide acts in
Michigan. Kelly Lyn Mitchell, Note, Physician Assisted Suicide: A Survey of the Issues
Surrounding Legalization, 74 N.D. L. REV. 341, 353 (1998); see also Kevorkian v. Arnett,
136 F.3d 1360 (9 b
h Cir. 1998); Kevorkian v. Thompson, 947 F.Supp. 1152 (E.D. Mich.
1997); People v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994). However, on March 26, 1999,
Kevorkian was found guilty of second-degree murder in the death of Thomas Youk. Jack
Kevorkian; Sister Ann R. Key; Freda Alexander; Roland Dumas, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Apr. 5, 1999, at 14. This incident is very different from Kevorkian's previous acts
of assisting suicide. Id. Kevorkian himself injected Youk, who suffered from Lou Gehrig's
disease, with lethal potassium chloride. Id. A tape of Youk's death aired on CBS's 60
Minutes. Id. Kevorkian's act in this case has been described as "a step so brazen that most
assisted suicide backers distanced themselves from the man dubbed Dr. Death." Id. It
appears that in this case, Kevorkian may have crossed over the fine line many draw between
assisted suicide and euthanasia. Cf id.
27 In 1938, a Unitarian Minister began the Euthanasia Society which was the first pro-
euthanasia group in the U.S. Gaumer & Griffith, supra note 25, at 364. The movement in
favor of legalized physician assisted suicide was initiated by Derek Humphrey, the founder
of the Hemlock Society. George J. Annas, Conference Proceedings: Science and the Law,
The "Right to Die" in America: Sloganeering from Quinlan and Cruzan to Quill and
Kevorkian, 34 DuQ. L. REV. 875, 890 (1996). The Hemlock Society and Humphrey gained
notoriety with his book Jean's Way which detailed the assisted suicide of Humphrey's first
wife. JOHNSTON, supra note 25, at 2.
28 The following states disapprove of assisted suicide in laws regarding living wills:
Alabama, ALA. CODE § 22-8A-10 (1990); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.080(f) (1994);
Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3210 (1993); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-
210(g) (Michie 1991); California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191.5(g) (West Supp.
1995); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-112(1) (1987); Washington, D.C., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-2430 (1989); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.309(1) (West Supp. 1995); Georgia,
GA. CODE ANN. § 88-4111 (b) (Supp. 1994); Hawaii, HAw. REV. STAT. § 327D-13 (Supp.
1992); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755, para. 35/9(f) (Smith-Hurd 1992); Indiana, IND.
728 [Vol. 32:4
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The debate finally reached the United States Supreme Court in 1997 in
CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-19 (Bums 1993); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A11.6 (West 1989);
Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 109 (1992); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.639
(Michie/Bobbs - Merrill Supp. 1994); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.10.A
(West 1992); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-711(g) (West Supp. 1994);
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. § 5-611 (c) (1994); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145B.14 (West Supp. 1995); Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-117(2) (1993);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 459.055(5) (Vernon 1992); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-
9-205(7) (1993); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-412(7) (Supp. 1994); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.670(2) (Michie 1991); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-
H: 13 (Supp. 1994); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320(b) (1993); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.4-01(1991); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.12(D)
(Anderson 1994); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.12(G) (West Supp. 1995);
Pennsylvania, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5402(b) (Supp. 1994); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-4.11-10(f) (Supp. 1994); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-77-130 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1994); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-12D-20 (1994);
Tennessee, TE. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.020 (West 1992); Utah, UTAH CODE
ANN. § 75-2-1118 (1993); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990 (Michie 1994);
Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.100 (Supp. 1995); West Virginia, W.VA.
CODE § 16-30-10 (1995); Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.11(6) (West 1989); Wyoming,
WYO. STAT. § 35-22-109 (1994).
29 Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (1978); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1103(A)(3) (1989); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (1987); California,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (1998); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (1990);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (1992); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1994);
Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b) (1988); Illinois, ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-
31(1992); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-42-1-2 (1998); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 707A.2,
707A.3 (1996); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 31-3406 (1992); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 216:302 (1994); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 204 (1983); Michigan, Act
of December 15, 1992, 1992 P.A. 270; Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.215 (1998);
Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.023
(1983); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1981); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-
307 (Supp. 1977); New Hampshire, N.H. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1997); New Jersey, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-6 (1995); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (1978); New York,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1997); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-
04 (1991); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §818 (1983) (only effective until July 1,
1999); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2505 ('1998); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 11-60-1, 11-60-3 (1996); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-16-37
(1998); Tennessee, TE. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.020 (West 1992); Texas, TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN § 22.08 (1994); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9a.36.060
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Washington v. Glucksberg3° and Vacco v. Quill.31 In Glucksberg, the Court held
that Washington's prohibition of assisted suicide32 did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 3 The Court concluded "that the asserted 'right' to assistance in
committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause."'34 At the same time, the Court decided in Vacco that New York's
ban of assisted suicide35 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.36 Although the Court disposed of both cases by denying
constitutional protection of this "right to die," the decision to legalize assisted
suicide was left open for the state legislatures to address.37  These decisions
promulgated guidelines for all future assisted suicide cases arising under
constitutional provisions.38
30117 S. Ct. 225 8 (1997). Washington physicians who treat terminally ill patients sought
a declaratory judgment that the state statute prohibiting assisted suicide was
unconstitutional. These physicians asserted that they would help certain gravely ill patients
commit suicide, but refrained because of the statute. Id.
"1 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). New York physicians claimed that they would assist
"mentally competent, terminally ill patients" with suicide if they were not deterred by the
state's statute prohibiting assisted suicide. Id.
32 "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids
another person to attempt suicide." WASH. REV. CODE § 9a.36.060(1) (1994).
13 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
34 Id. at 2271. The Court relied on the historical treatment of suicide and listed four
major policy reasons which indicate the state's compelling interests in not allowing assisted
suicide: (1) "an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life;" (2) "an interest in
protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession;" (3) "an interest in protecting
vulnerable groups-including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse,
neglect, and mistakes" and; (4) "the state may fear that permitting assisted suicide will start
it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary euthanasia." Id. at 2272-74.
35 "A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when... (3) He intentionally
causes or aids another person to commit suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney
1987). "A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally causes or
aids another person to attempt suicide." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30.
36 Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2296. The court in Vacco explained that there is a valid
distinction between assisted suicide, which the Court defined as "making a patient die," and
refusing life saving treatment, which the Court defined as "letting a patient die." Id. at 2301.
37 See supra note 5. Both the majority and the concurring opinions made it clear that the
states could enact legislation and that the court would address the issue again. See also
Urofsky, supra note 5, at 313.
38 After Glucksberg and Vacco "a state supreme court could thus find a limited right to
assistance in suicide in the state's constitution but nonetheless uphold laws prohibiting
assisted suicide because the state's interest in avoiding a slide from assisted suicide to
euthanasia is compelling." George J. Annas, The Bell Tolls for a Constitutional Right to
730 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Charles Hall suffered from Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
related illnesses39 and doctors considered him to be in terminal condition.' Hall
wanted to choose the time and place of his death," but feared a failed suicide
attempt would leave him with greater suffering.42 Dr. Cecil McIver43 was willing
to help Hall in this endeavor, but potential prosecution under the Florida statute
deterred him from helping Hall.44
B. Procedural History
Hall and Mclver 45 sought a declaratory judgment regarding the
constitutionality of the Florida prohibition of assisted suicide46 and an injunction
to prevent the state from prosecuting Mclver.47 The trial court ruled in favor of
Physician-Assisted Suicide, NEW ENG. J. MED., Oct. 9, 1997, at 1201. The author argues
that this is exactly what the Florida Supreme Court did in Krischer. Id.
" Hall contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97,
99 (Fla. 1997). Hall was frequently hospitalized for a variety of illnesses including AIDS,
Reiter's Syndrome, cytomegalovirus, Hepatitis B virus, Herpes Simplex types 1 and 2,
H.Pylori, and Epstein-Barr virus. In addition, Hall was legally blind and suffered from sores
on various parts of his body and stomach pains. Hall relied on morphine in attempting to
relieve his pain. Mclver v. Krischer, 1997 WL 225878, *1-2 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1997), rev.
granted, 689 So. 2d 1070 (1997), rev'd., Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (1997).
40 Mclver, 1997 WL 225878 at *2.
41 Id. The mode of death would be "by administering a substance which will induce
immediate loss of consciousness and certain death shortly thereafter." Id.
42 Hall requested assistance in committing suicide when his suffering reached "the point
where he will no longer feel the comfort and assurance of knowing that his agony will be
followed by a period of acceptably renewed health." Id. He consulted with physicians in
the hopes of obtaining a lethal prescription. Id.
43 Id. Although Mclver was not Halls primary or treating physician, Mclver had
observed Hall's deteriorating condition and reviewed his medical records. Id.
4 Id. at3.
45 Two original plaintiffs, C.B. Castonguay and Robert G. Cron died prior to trial; both
were dismissed as parties. Mclver, 1997 WL 225878 at *1-2.
"See supra note 7.
4' Mclver, 1997 WL 225878 at *1.
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Hall and McIver. 4 The Fourth District Court of Appeals affirmed49 and the Florida
Supreme Court reversed. 'o
C. Reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court
1. Federal Constitutional Issues
The United States Supreme Court issued the Glucksberg and Vacco opinions
before Krischer reached the Florida Supreme Court.5 1 Glucksberg and Vacco
disposed of the federal questions for the Krischer court. 2
2. The Florida Privacy Amendment
In reversing, the Florida Supreme Court relied on essentially the same policy
reasons elucidated in the lower court decision: "(1) the preservation of life,53 (2) the
"' The court decided that although Hall did not have a substantive due process right to
physician assisted suicide, he did have a right to assistance under the Equal Protection
Clause and the state Privacy Amendment. Id. at *5-10. In deciding the privacy issue, the
trial court only considered the facts before it. Id. at *5-6. It weighed Hall's right to make
his own medical decision against the state's interests in preserving life and preventing
suicide, protecting innocent third parties, and maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical
profession. Id. at *7-8. After balancing all of these factors, the court decided that they were
"insufficient to overcome the privacy interests asserted by Mr. Hall in this case." Id. at *8.
The trial court issued a declaratory judgment stating that Hall had a constitutional right to
have his physician assist his suicide. Id. at *10. The court also gave an injunction
precluding the state from prosecuting Mclver for assisting Hall with his suicide. Id. at * 11.
Hall's competence was important to the court in this decision. Id. at *3. Competence can
be determined by a three part test: (1) possession of a set of values and goals, (2) the ability
to communicate and understand information, and (3) the ability to reason and deliberate
about one's choices. Steven Miles et al., Considerations of Safeguards Proposed in Laws
and Guidelines to Legalize Assisted Suicide, in PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE 213 (1997).
49 The appeals court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Florida: whether a
competent, terminally ill adult has a constitutional right to physician assisted suicide.
Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 99 (Fla. 1997).
'0 Id. at 104.
51 Both cases were decided June 26, 1997. See Washington v. Gucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2258 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997). The immediate case was decided July
17, 1997. See Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d at 97 (Fla. 1997).
12 See supra notes 30-31, 33-34.
53 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. This unqualified interest in preserving life is reflected in
the commitment to homicide laws across the country. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2272. Two
main tenets underlie the preservation of life principle: (1) "the absolute inviolability of
human life," and (2) "the equal value of all human life." Matthew P. Previn, Note, Assisted
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prevention of suicide, 54 (3) the protection of innocent third parties,55 and (4) the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. 56 The court held
that "three of the four recognized state interests are so compelling as to clearly
outweigh Mr. Hall's desire for assistance in committing suicide."57
Suicide and Religion: Conflicting Conceptions of the Sanctity of Human Life, 847 GEO. L.J.
589, 592-93 (1996). This concept is entrenched in religious and historical ideals and is
arguably the most important of the state's interests. Id.
54 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. One commentator argued that the prevention of suicide
is an outgrowth from the principle that life should always be preserved. Previn, supra note
53, at 93. This interest is based in the fear that allowing assisted suicide will lead down a
dangerous path to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2274. "If
suicide is protected as a matter of right, it is argued, every man and woman in the U.S. must
enjoy it." Id. Some of the major fears are for patients who may be coerced into ending their
lives; patients who may opt for physician assisted suicide without having received all
pallative care interventions; patients ending their lives for economic reasons; and
nonconsenting patients having their lives ended. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Future of
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide: Beyond Rights Talk to Informed Public Policy,
82 MiNN. L. REV. 983, 1007 (1998).
5 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. This interest is typically asserted when minor children
might be abandoned after their parent exercises his/her right to die. Public Health Trust of
Dade County v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989); see also Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551
N.E. 2d 77, 83 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that there is no restriction upon right to refuse medical
treatment when patient has minor dependents).
56 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. When a physician takes the Hippocratic Oath he
promises: "I will neither give a deadly drug to any one if asked for it nor will I make a
suggestion to this effect." Physician assisted suicide directly conflicts with this basic tenet
of the medical profession. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2273 (1997).
Today, the American Medical Association, in keeping with the doctrine of the Hippocratic
Oath, is opposed to physician assisted suicide. AMA Starts 'End of Life' Programs in
Hospice Care, CHI. SuN TIMES, October 18, 1998, at 27. But see Previn, supra note 53, at
594 (explaining that when the Hippocratic Oath was adopted by the Pythagoreans it
expressed their view on the sanctity of life which was not necessarily the prevailing view
in medical ethics at the time and that Christianity was the catalyst for the spread of the oath).
But, some argue that it is a doctor's duty to relieve suffering and in some cases assisted
suicide is the only way to accomplish this goal. See, e.g., Pamela R. Ferguson, Causing
Death or Allowing to Die? Developments in the Law, 23 JAMA 368, 369 (1997) ("If the
first purpose of medicine- the restoration of health can no longer be achieved, there is still
much for a doctor to do, and he is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve
pain and suffering, even if measures he takes may incidentally shorten life").
17 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. Since no evidence presented the effect of Hall's suicide
on innocent third parties, the court relied on the state's interests in preserving life,
preventing suicide and maintaining the integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 102-3.
The court also relied heavily on the 1984 New York State Task Force on Life and the Law's
recommendations against assisted suicide. Id. at 101-02
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In addition, the court reexamined the distinction between the right to assisted
suicide and the right to refuse treatment under the privacy amendment. 8 To deny
privacy protection, the court classified assisted suicide as an affirmative act that
directly causes the death of the patient.5 9 Other acts, which are protected by the
privacy amendment either do not cause death 6° or involve withholding treatment,
which leads to death from natural causes.6 '
58 Id. The court reasoned that the help requested in physician assisted cases is not
treatment in the normal sense of the term. Id. at 102. The major factor in this distinction
is that if life-support is removed, the patient basically dies of natural causes. Id. The
difference is whether death is caused by the disease or a lethal dose of medication. id. This
distinction is essentially a legal question of causation. See Ferguson, supra note 56, at 371.
However, some argue that the distinction is moral; it centers on intent of the doctor and not
the choice of the patient. Fiona Randall, Why Causing Death Is Not Necessarily Morally
Equivalent to Allowing to Die - a Response to Ferguson, 23 J. MED. ETHICS 373, 373
(1997). Doctors do not intend to cause death when withdrawing life support because death
occurs from the underlying condition, while the doctors intent when assisting with suicide
is to cause death. Id. at 374. But see Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 110 (Harding, concurring).
[T]he majority's 'sharp' distinction between active and passive dying may cause
substantial mischief. The price could be, on one hand, agony forced upon dying
patients by physicians who simply do not know what else they can lawfully do,
or on the other hand, a legally questionable medical hypocrisy that distorts the
'active' versus 'passive' distinction in an effort to be humane.
Id.; George C. Garbesi, J.S.D., The Law of Assisted Suicide, 3 IssuEs L. & MED. 93, 94
(1987) (stating that "[n]ormally, a distinction cannot be made between positive and negative
acts for legal purposes, when discussing the developing law of assisted suicide in reference
to cases where life support treatment was withheld").
'9 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102.
60 See, e.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1989) (permitting pregnant minor
to obtain an abortion without her parent's consent). The U.S. Supreme Court and other
courts in this country have granted similar protection to affirmative acts. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992) (holding that the state's interest in the
life of a fetus before viability do not justify an intrusion on a woman's privacy right to an
abortion); American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997) (holding
that statute requiring minor to obtain parental consent before obtaining an abortion violates
privacy rights). But see Sylvia A. Law, Birth and Death: Doctor Control vs. Patient Choice,
82 MINN. L. REV. 1045 (1998) (arguing that a distinction between childbirth related
decisions and death decisions is valid based on inherent differences between the two
processes).
61 See, e.g., In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993) (finding that the privacy
amendment protected an individual who wanted to refuse a blood transfusion due to
religious beliefs); In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990) (allowing
surrogate to assert rights of woman who was vegetative but not terminally ill to remove
nasogastric feeding tube); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980) (addressing
whether individual suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease could remove artificial respirator
[Vol. 32:4
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Finally, the court addressed the possibility that the legislature could devise a
statute to legalize assisted suicide.6 2 The court's position is that making a final
conclusion on this issue is part of the legislature's function to consider public policy
and moral arguments in making law.
63
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Florida Privacy Amendment 6'
Despite granting relatively broad protection for privacy rights,65 Florida courts
have refused to interpret the right as absolute.66 The analysis of an individual's
rights under the privacy amendment involves a balance between the state's interests
and the hindrance of personal rights67 using a compelling state's interest standard. 68
needed to keep him alive).
62 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 104.
63 Id.
64 See supra note 2.65 The Florida right to privacy was intended to extend farther to protect more rights than
are guaranteed by the federal constitution. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1191 (Fla. 1989);
see also, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797 (Cal. 1997)
(indicating that the California privacy right has been construed more broadly than the federal
right).
66 Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989). If the privacy interest asserted
conflicts with a regulation which serves a compelling state interest there will be an intrusion
on the privacy rights. Id.
67 Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71, 76 (Fla. 1983). A
threshold issue in the analysis is whether the asserted rights fall within a protected zone of
privacy. Id. The state asserts that it will only protect rights which are "fundamental or
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Id. Examples of protected areas are marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education. Id. "The
means to carry out such compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored in the least
intrusive manner possible to safeguard the rights of the individual." In re Browning, 568
So. 2d 4, 14 (Fla. 1990). See also, e.g., In the Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)
(finding that privacy protection extends to patient's refusal of medical treatment); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (recognizing that individuals have the right to be
free from intrusion on matters which affect a woman's decision whether to have a child);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (1980) (affirming lower court decision which allowed
a terminally ill patient to refuse medical treatment); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla.
1993) (holding that patient can refuse a potentially life-saving blood transfusion); Fosmire
v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990) (arguing that state does not have superior interest
when patient wants to decline blood transfusions); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989)
(holding that the right to privacy encompasses a woman's right to an abortion). But see
Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutual Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1985) (finding that
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The Krischer court justified an intrusion of privacy rights based on compelling
state interests.69 In contrast to the lower court, the Florida Supreme Court looked
to the implications that Krischer might have beyond Hall's death.7 ° 'Essentially, the
opinion strayed from established principles of privacy in order to accomplish a
broader policy goal.71
1. Privacy Principles
In prior cases, privacy rights protected a range of rights, including a right to die
by refusing life-saving or life-sustaining treatment.72 These cases relied on the
principle that "the issue is not whether, but when, for how long, and at what cost to
the individual . . . life may be extended. '73 The rationale behind the variety of
situations where privacy protected an individual's medical decisions does not seem
to support the Krischer court's decision.74
state's interest in effective investigations of the pari-mutual industry outweighs an
individual's expectation of privacy in financial records); State v. Cunningham, 712 So. 2d
1221 (Fla. App. Ct. 1998) (holding that there is a compelling state interest in protecting
minors from harmful or exploitative sexual conduct by adults).68 "This test shifts the burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation serves a compelling state
interest and accomplishes its goal through the use of the least intrusive means." Winfield,
477 So. 2d at 546.
69 The court held that the state's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide and
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession outweighed Hall's interest in
having a physician assist with his suicide. Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97,102-04 (Fla.
1997).
'0 The trial court held that "[t]he state's legitimate concern cannot override Mr. Hall's
interest in foreshortening his existence by mere days." Krischer, 1997 WL 225878 at *7.
The court essentially only looked to the effect the decision would have on Hall. Id. The
supreme court, however, considered the statewide implications of Florida residents facing
'the slippery slope of determining the relative value of life." Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 101.
71 See generally Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide - Even A Very Limited Form,
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (discussing policy arguments against legalized
assisted suicide); see also M. Cathleen Kaveny, Propter Honoris Respectum, Managed
Care, Assisted Suicide, and Vulnerable Populations, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1299-
1307 (1998) (explaining the dangers of legalizing assisted suicide, especially in light of the
current state of health care).
72 See supra note 61 for examples.
71 In re Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d at 14 (citing Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 160, 162 (Fla. 4t' DCA 1978) (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425-26 (Mass. 1977)).
14 The Florida Supreme Court had previously used privacy to protect a right to die for a
terminal patient whose life would only be temporarily and artificially extended by medical
[Vol. 32:4
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For example, In re Dubreuil5 held that a patient had a right under the Privacy
Amendment to refuse a life saving blood transfusion.76 In Dubreuil, the Florida
Supreme Court decided that the patient's right to make choices regarding her
medical care outweighed the state's interests. 77 In another case, In re T.W., 78 the
court used the Privacy Amendment to allow a minor to obtain an abortion without
parental consent. 79 The court found that "a substantial invasion of a pregnant
female's privacy by the state ... is not necessary" to promote compelling state
interests.
8 0
Krischer must be reconciled with these and other privacy decisions. In contrast
to Dubreuil and In re T.W., the Krischer court distinguished between right to die
cases using a means based test rather than contemplating only the individual's right
to make medical decisions. 1 The means based test distinguishes between the cause
of death: in assisted suicide, death is caused by an affirnative act, while in the other
procedures. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see also John F.
Kennedy Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 924 (Fla. 1984) ("The issue in
these cases is not whether a life should be saved. Rather, it is how long and at what cost the
dying process should be prolonged").
7' 629 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1993)
76 Patricia Dubreuil was a Jehovah's Witness. Id. at 820. Because of her religious
beliefs, Dubreuil refused to consent to a life-saving blood transfusion after her child was
delivered by a Cesarean section. Id. at 821. The hospital petitioned the court to issue an
immediate declaratory judgment to override the patient's refusal of the transfusions. Id.
The trial court held for the hospital and authorized the transfusion. Id. at 821. The Florida
Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 820.
77 In this case, Dubreuil's death would leave her two minor children abandoned.
Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d at 826. The court held that this was not sufficient to justify an
intrusion of her privacy. Id.
7 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).79 Id. at 1194. A teenager desired to have an abortion without informing her mother. Id.
at 1189. However, the parental consent statute set out a procedure a minor must follow
before receiving an abortion; part of the procedure was parental authorization. Id. at 1188-
89. The teenager challenged the statute through a guardian ad litem. Id. The statute was
found to be unconstitutional because it encroached on the minor's privacy rights from the
time of conception until birth. Id. at 1194. An intrusion of this magnitude was not
necessary to promote the state's interests. Id. at 1194.
80 Id.
8' Krischer v. McIver, 697 So. 2d 97, 102 (Fla. 1997). The means based test looks at the
action of the physician which leads to death and makes a distinction between affirmative and
negative acts. Id. Affirmative acts (such as assisted suicide) which cause death are
prohibited while negative acts (such as withdrawing or withholding treatment) which leads
to death are permitted. Id.
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circumstances an omission of treatment results in death. 2 While the means based
test avoids precedents like Dubrueil,8 3 in some situations, such as In re T. W., courts
protected affirmative acts on a person's body.84 The means based test ignores the
fact that in some cases "there is no question death must occur, and must occur
painfully."'8 5 Considering the balancing test 86 used in prior decisions, in these
12 See supra notes 57-60.
83 The distinction between affirmative and negative acts differentiates between these
types of cases. C.f Kamisar, supra note 71, at 754-55.
There are significant moral and legal distinctions between letting die .. .and
killing. In letting die, the cause of death is seen as the underlying disease process
or trauma. In assisted suicide/euthanasia, the cause of death is seen as the
inherently lethal action itself .... There must be an underlying fatal pathology if
allowing to die is even possible. Killing... provides its own fatal pathology.
Nothing but the action of the doctor giving the lethal injection is necessary to bring
about death.
Id. 84 In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989) (approving the right to terminate a pregnancy);
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that the right of choice to have
a child is protected). But see Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. App.
2d. 1986). The court discussed the affirmative/negative act distinction. Id. "[I]t is
significant that the instances and the means there discussed all involved affirmative,
assertive, proximate, direct conduct such as furnishing a gun, poison, knife, or other
instrumentality or usable means which another could physically and immediately inflict
some death producing injury upon himself." Id. "Such situations are far different than the
mere presence of a doctor during the exercise of his patient's constitutional rights." Id.
85 Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 111 (Fla. 1997) (Kogan, J. dissenting). The dissent
in Krischer argued that privacy principles should be particularly applicable when the
individual reaches the death bed. Id. The state has no articulable interest in saving a life
which only consists of "a final convulsion of agony." Id. Further, when a physician
withholds treatment, the patient will die, which means the doctor is assisting with the
patient's death. Julia Pugliese, Don't Ask - Don't Tell: The Secret Practice of Physician
Assisted Suicide, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1291, 1313 (1993). Those patients who do not require
treatment to stay alive must suffer through their illness which will end in a painful death at
an undetermined time. Id. Sometimes death by the disease is more painful and cruel than
a physician assisting suicide or performing euthanasia. Id. But see Karnisar, supra note 71,
at 756.
Although it closes an 'avenue of escape', a ban on assisted suicide does not totally
occupy a person's life or make affirmative use of his body. However, to deny a
person the right to be disconnected from artificial life-support is to force one into
a particular, all-consuming, totally dependent, and indeed rigidly standardized life:
the life of one confined to a hospital bed, attached to medical machinery, and
tended to by medical professionals. It is a life almost totally occupied. The
person's body is, moreover, so far expropriated from his own will, supposing that
he seeks to die, that the most elemental acts of existence - such as breathing,
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instances it seems that what is left of the individual's life should be determinative
and not the way life ends.87
2. Public Policy
Since, in many cases, constitutional rights are amorphous and ambiguous,8
recognizing a right to assisted suicide without limitations could lead to disastrous
results. 89 Although the decision in Krischer may seem contrary to established
privacy principles, 90 the ramifications from constitutionally protected assisted
suicide are more frightening than the scenarios presented in prior cases.9' By
digesting, and circulating blood - are forced upon him by an external agency.
Id.
16 See supra note 67-68 and accompanying text.
87 "We think that the State's interest Contra weakens and the individual's right to privacy
grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there
comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest." In the Matter
of Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976). But see Cruzan v. Director, 497 U.S. 61, 82
(1990) ("[W]e think a State may properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of
life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an unqualified interest in the
preservation of human life to be weighed against the constitutionally protected interests of
the individual").
88 This is especially true for the right of privacy. Lyon, supra note 21, at 1368. Privacy
does not appear in the constitution. Id. "[ilt appears and disappears in the penumbrae and
emanations of specific guarantees in the bill of rights .. " Id. Thus, no concise definition
of privacy exists. Id.
89 Since the right to refuse treatment is not limited to the terminally ill, neither would a
right to assisted suicide. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 109 (Fla. 1997) (Harding,
concurring); see also, e.g., Michael McGonnigal, This Is Who Will Die When Doctors Are
Allowed to Kill Their Patients, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 95 (providing an in depth
discussion of the potential victims of assisted suicide). See also Symposium, Physician-
Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After Glucksberg and Quill, Empowering and Protecting
Patients: Lessons for Physician-Assisted Suicide from the African American Experience, 82
MiNN. L. REV. 1015 (1998) (discussing that stigmatized minority groups are often forgotten
when analyzing the dangers associated with assisted suicide).
90 See generally Brewer, supra note 12, at 824 (discussing the Krischer court's departure
from a trend which broadened the scope of the privacy amendment).
9' For example, some argue that physicians who assist suicide are just implements of a
society which refuses to care for the dying. Yale Kamisar, Opinion, Opposition to assisted
Suicide Involves More Than Morality, DET. NEws, Oct. 15, 1998, at A 12. In contrast to the
withdrawal of treatment and abortion cases, assisted suicide does not have to be limited to
terminally ill. Kamisar, supra note 71, at 749-50. Giving or not giving an abortion, in most
instances does not cause the death of the woman. Id. at 750. The withdrawal of treatment
will only lead to the death of an already dying person. Id. Assisted suicide, however, can
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adopting the United States Supreme Court's position and not permitting assisted
suicide,92 the Krischer court illustrated a concern for the potential dangers
stemming from a broad constitutional protection.93
One major worry is for individuals who may be victimized by assisted
suicide.
94
be a death option for anyone. Id. The practice can also spread to active euthanasia for those
who cannot complete the act for themselves, and would otherwise live. Id.; see also supra
note 89.
92 Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 100. The opinions strongly support a ban of assisted suicide.
Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After Glucksberg and Quill, On the
Meaning and Impact of the Physician -Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L. REV. 895, 900
(1998). "Now that the Supreme Court has rejected their main constitutional arguments...
proponents of PAS [physician assisted suicide] are in a weaker position than they were
before these lawsuits commenced," because the state legislatures are not likely to accept
arguments which were unsuccessful in the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
93 "[A]uthorization of assisted suicide by the courts would actually cause more problems
than it would solve for the terminally ill." Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 106 (Justice Overton,
concurring opinion).
94 Many groups are at risk of becoming victims of assisted suicide. McGonnigal, supra
note 89, at 109. First, are patients whose physicians are unsuccessful at treating their pain.
Id. at 109-110. Statistics also show that individuals who request assisted suicide suffer from
some type of depression. Id. at 111-12. Next, some people who are unhappy with life may
use a terminal diagnosis as an excuse to commit suicide. Id. at 115. Another fear is that
physicians might influence some patients to opt for assisted suicide. Id. at 115-16. In
addition, people who are abandoned might choose assisted suicide instead of facing life
alone. Id. at 116-17. Some fear that those who are victims of fashion might begin to weigh
their quality of life and decide that if it is not up to a certain standard that it is not worth
living. Id. at 117-18. Additionally, a patient might receive an incorrect diagnosis or a faulty
prognosis and make a rash decision before the mistake is discovered. Id. at 118-19. Also,
some might not consider the pain that suicide would cause loved-ones; these people might
choose to live if these consequences were contemplated. Id. at 119. Other people might fear
their last days so much that they decide on assisted suicide before the suffering even starts.
Id. at 120. Further, some may want to stop the emotional and financial burdens placed on
their families by the dying process. Id. at 132-135. Finally, other ill patients may be pushed
into assisted suicide by greedy heirs. Id. at 135-36; see also Mark E. Chopko, Michigan
State Medical Society Mackinac Island Conference on Bioethics: A Deliberation on Ethics
in Medicine, Responsible Public Policy at the End of Life, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 557,
589 (1998) ("Even for 'non-vulnerable' populations, legalization of assisted suicide will
substantially alter medical practice for all. Allowing assisted suicide would exacerbate
current adverse trends in delivery of health services. The pressure to save money is already
great. Every operational assumption about assisted suicide is that it is cost effective");
Raanan Gillon, Michigan State Medical Society Mackinac Island Conference on Bioethics:
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In addition, some fear that the slide down the slippery slope towards involuntary
euthanasia would begin almost immediately after assisted suicide is given
constitutional protection.95 Exacerbating the problem are the emotional issues
which often underlie a decision to commit suicide,96 because a focus on death
A Deliberation on Ethics in Medicine: Physician Assisted Suicide - Sympathy and
Skepticism, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 499, 509 (1998) ("[O]pponents of euthanasia
foresee ... coercion of people into volunteering for euthanasia .... [O]ne has the vision of
a little old lady who is coming towards the end of her life who now feels... I ought to have
physician assisted suicide now because I am becoming a burden either on the state... or on
my family or whoever"); John Keown, Article, The Legal Revolution: From "Sanctity of
Life" to "Quality of Life " and "Autonomy ", 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 253, 260
(1998) ("[V]aluation of human life grounds the principle that, because certain lives are not
worth living, it is right to intentionally terminate those lives, whether by act or omission").
9' The Netherlands provide the only real empirical evidence of legalized physician
assisted suicide. DECOURCY, supra note 20, at 19. The practice became acceptable in 1973
when a court allowed assisted suicide for terminally ill patients in severe pain. Id. In 1984,
the practice expanded to allow doctors to give anyone with an incurable disease a lethal dose
of drugs. Id. A year later, a court decided that the patient does not have to be terminal.
Physicians can help the chronically ill or babies with severe birth defects die. Id. In 1993,
assisted suicide was approved for psychological pain. Id. A 1990 study revealed that in
over 1000 (0.8% of the total deaths in the Netherlands) cases each year, Dutch physicians
actively caused the patient's death without consent. Herbert Hendin et al., Physician-
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the Netherlands, 227 JAMA 1720, 1721 (1997). In a
1995 study, this figure declined to 0.7% (some critics disagree with the accuracy of the 1995
survey). Id. Regardless of the reliability of the study, doctors are terminating lives without
express consent. Id. Even more shocking is that in 48% of these cases, there was never a
request for assisted suicide; patients only made reference to a desire not to suffer. Id. Some
Dutch physicians try to explain this by insisting that the patients were competent. Id.
However, in 1990, 37% of these patients whose lives were terminated without express
consent were competent, and in 1995 only 21% were competent. Id. Both studies revealed
that 59% of Dutch physicians do not even report their assisted suicide and euthanasia cases,
while 50% will freely suggest either or both of these options to their patients. Id. at 1722.
96 A suicidal individual often has more than just physical pain. Chopko, supra note 94,
at 573. "When patients do seek assisted suicide, it is usually because untreated depression
or inadequate pain relief drives them." Susan M. Wolf, Pragmatism in the Face of Death:
The Role of Facts in the Assisted Suicide Debate, 82 U. MINN. L. REv. 1063, 1100 (1998).
Studies reveal that patients requesting suicide suffer from depression. Thomas R. Reardon,
Michigan State Medical Society, Mackinac Island Conference on Bioethics: A Deliberation
on Ethics in Medicine, Speech, American Medical Association Perspective on Physician
Assisted Suicide, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 515, 519 (1998). Research indicates that many
suicidal individuals change their minds when depression or other mental disorders are
treated. Chopko, supra note 94, at 573.
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ignores these problems which may prompt suicidal feelings; 97 the option of assisted
suicide as a matter of right may reduce physicians' incentive to address mental
issues which could change the patient's mind about suicide.
98
B. Legislative Action99
Sadly, there are some patients for whom palliative care 1" ° fails.'0 ' Can morals
justify competent individuals suffering needless pain during their last days?' 2
Courts addressing the issue acknowledge that legalization would actually benefit
these people.'0 3 However there must be safeguards to ensure that this option is not
abused.1°4
97 The request for assisted suicide may be a cry for help because the physician is not
adequately treating pain. Reardon, supra note 96, at 519.
98 Cf. Chopko supra note 94, at 573. "[L]egal assisted suicide could make it more
difficult for the State to protect depressed or mentally ill persons, or those who are suffering
from untreated pain, from suicidal impulses." Id.
99 For an excellent discussion of the issues surrounding legislative action and a proposed
model assisted suicide statute, see Charles H. Baron et al., A Model State Act to Authorize
and Regulate Physician Assisted Suicide, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,7 (1996).
'00 "Palliative care is the standard of care for people who are dying." Timothy Quill,
Michigan State Medical Society, Mackinac Island Conference on Bioethics: A Deliberation
on Ethics in Medicine, Physician Assisted Death: After the U.S. Supreme Court Ruling, 75
U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 481, 488 (1998).
101 See, e.g., id.
'o2 Id. "[W]e have an obligation to respond to those for whom good palliative care,
applied without restraint, fails." Id.
103 Emanuel, supra note 54, at 1003. "[S]ome terminally ill patients who want to end
their lives suffer needlessly. Some other people would find reassurance just from having
the option of PAS (physician assisted suicide) and euthanasia even if they never actually
used the procedures. Legalization would certainly benefit these people" (emphasis added).
Id.
104 Four safeguards used in the Netherlands have been placed in U.S. proposals for
legalized assisted suicide: "(1) the patient must be terminally ill; (2) the patient must be
competent and initiate and repeatedly request euthanasia or PAS; (3) the patient must be
experiencing severe pain and/or suffering; and (4) the patient must be evaluated by another
physician, who may be a psychiatrist." Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., The Practice of
Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide in the United States: Adherence to Proposed
Safeguards and Effects on Physicians, 280 JAMA 507, 507 (1998). Secondary safeguards
are also proposed: "(1) optimal pain and palliative care services have been provided to the
patient; (2) the physician and patient have a long-standing relationship; and the patients
family has been informed and supports the decision." Id.
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The fact is, if we allow assisted suicide in the United States, legislative action
is probably the safest means. 10 5 "[S]tringent and effective" rules might be able to
prevent abuse of an assisted suicide option, °6 but the potential for abuse cannot be
eliminated. 10 7 Even so, the courts are just not the best implement for the necessary
limitations. 0 8 Judges are apprehensive about guaranteeing a right which may usurp
the legislative function.109 Moreover, the decision to legalize assisted suicide
requires a careful analysis of all the underlying facts and policies."0 The legislature
is best suited for this task."'
'05 The legislature is probably the best institution to deal with this issue at this time.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2293 (1997) (Souter, J. concurring).
106 Urofsky, supra note 5, at 404.
The law.., must protect people who think it would be appalling to be killed, even
if they had only painful minutes to live. But the law must also protect those with
the opposite conviction: that it would be appalling not to be offered an easier,
calmer death with the help of doctors they trust.
Id.
10 7 But see Hendin, supra note 95, at 1722. "[T]he Dutch experience indicates that these
practices defy adequate regulation. Given legal sanction, euthanasia, intended originally for
the exceptional case, has become an accepted way of dealing with serious or terminal illness
.... " Id. The potential for abuse cannot be totally eliminated. Emanuel, supra note 54, at
1003.
'ts Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293 (Souter, J. concurring); see also Kamisar, supra note
71, at 749 (doubting that a court can make the decision on assisted suicide in one case
because of all the policy arguments requiring consideration).
'0 Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2293.
An unenumerated right should not therefore be recognized, with the effect of
displacing the legislative ordering of things, without the assurance that its
recognition would prove as durable as the recognition of those other rights
differently derived. To recognize a right of lesser promise would simply create a
constitutional regime too uncertain to bring with it the expectation of finality that
is one of this Court's central obligations in making constitutional decisions.
Id.
flo Id.; see also Baron, supra note 99, at 7. The best way to address the issue in society
is through legislative action. Id. at 8. First, because physicians fear prosecution under
ambiguous rules, the dying are denied assistance. Id. The fear of prosecution also leads to
secret assisted suicides. Id. Next, a statute would place accountability on physicians for
their actions. Id. at 9. Further, without physician assistance many patients will attempt
suicide on their own and fail, increasing their suffering. Id. Additionally, some may choose
to end their lives in anticipation of suffering which might never materialize. Id. Finally,
without physician assistance, patients may choose to end their lives alone without
reassurance of a doctor and the comfort of family. Id.
"' Id. Justice Overton in his concurring opinion in Krischer best stated these concerns:
[T]his Court may never be able to find an exception for an as-applied challenge to
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Oregon was the first state to legalize assisted suicide. 11 2 Now that the statute
is finally in effect, the entire country is watching what is likely to be the model for
other states' assisted suicide laws. 1 3 After the Krischer, Glucksberg and Vacco
decisions, state legislatures rather than the courts, will be the focus in the public
debate on assisted suicide.
11 4
V. CONCLUSION
For now, there is no way out for terminally ill patients who want to end their
suffering 15 because U.S. courts are protecting all lives in anticipation of state
legislative action.1 1 6 Constitutional and privacy rights do not protect patients who
want to commit suicide and the physicians who want to help.'
17
So, what are the options? They are "not to give carte blanche to take a life
simply because that life is unbearable. To allow that would be letting any Tom,
the statute until extensive evaluation of the problems involved in this issue occurs
and the many difficult questions are answered. The public would be much better
served if the legislature, with significant input from the medical and scientific
community, would craft appropriate exceptions to the general prohibition of
assisted suicide, which would include suitable standards, definitions, and
procedures ensuring that the use of assisted suicide would truly be used to assist
only those individuals who suffer unbearable pain in the face of certain death.
Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97,107 (Fla. 1997). But see Laura L. Hirschfeld, Moral
Dilemmas for the Judiciary at the Millennium: Partial Birth Abortions and Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1061, 1065 (1997) ("We should be concerned about
handing over that kind of power over human life to a bureaucracy, whether it is a corporate
bureaucracy... or worse, the government.").
112 Oregon passed an initiative allowing physician assisted suicide in November 1994.
Baron, supra note 99, at 14. The constitutionality of the "Death with Dignity" act was
immediately challenged. Id.; see also Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9b Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct 328 (1997) (reversing lower court decision that the Death with Dignity Act
was unconstitutional); Hamilton v. Myers, 943 P.2d 214 (Ore. 1997) (en banc) (upholding
constitutionality of Death with Dignity Act).
113 Cf. Baron, supra note 99, at 14-15. The first official figures on deaths after the act
became effective indicate that ten people have been given lethal prescriptions. Linda 0.
Prager, Details Emerge on Oregon's First Assisted Suicides, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7,
1998, at 9. Physicians in Oregon have stated that all the patients so far have been competent
and requested the lethal prescriptions with the approval of their families. Id. Critics suggest
that these reports are inaccurate because they have been sanitized. Id. at 10.
114 See supra notes 38-39, 99-113 and accompanying text.
115 See, e.g., id.
116 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997).
117 See Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97, 104 (Fla. 1997).
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Dick or Harry to hang out a Grim Reaper shingle."' 8 Currently, the only legal
options are withdrawing unwanted life support systems, and providing the best pain
relief methods available while waiting for legislative action. " 9
Eryn R. Ace
11 Editorial, supra note 5, at 52.
19 Wolf, supra note 96, at 1100.
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